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A PLAN TO RESOURCE THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY -PROGRAMING, AND BUDGETING FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS
Building partnership capacity invigorates our efforts and acknowledges that future challenges can be met only through the integrated use of all elements of national power… ⎯Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff 1 As a result of lack of coordination between military services in past operations such as Urgent Fury, Congress enacted the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986.
Goldwater Nichols sought to enhance military effectiveness by improving Jointness.
Unfortunately, the unity of effort that Goldwater Nichols sought for military planning and operations has not migrated to U.S. interagency operations. 2 Echoing that fact, the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), states that:
Today's environment resembles a challenge that is different in kind, but similar in scale, to the cold war -a challenge so immense that it requires major shifts in strategic concepts for national security and the role of military power. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.
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Given the seamless nature of the current threat, U.S. policy approaches to national and homeland security should be seamless as well. 4 The QDR recognizes that in this age of fast moving, volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) environment, government must be more integrated, agile and adaptive in executing its National Security Strategy (NSS). Although many non Department of Defense (DoD) agencies possess the knowledge and skills needed to perform tasks critical to complex operations, they are often not chartered or resourced to maintain deployable capabilities. 5 "It is a simple fact that today, U.S. operational capability rests almost entirely within the Department of Defense." 6 In addition to the challenge of creating integrated agency actions, every administration grapples with translating its strategic priorities into realistic programs and budgets. 7 Resourcing an improved planning effort will be integral to its successful implementation. Federal resourcing is not well linked to national security strategy or integrated to use interagency capabilities.
Improving the linkage of interagency strategy and planning efforts with resourcing will take an integrated effort from the top down. Better linkage of strategy and resourcing would improve the ability of the U.S. to engage all elements of national power to achieve National Security Strategy.
To strengthen the relationship between strategy and resourcing, the Executive Branch should adopt an improved and simplified DoD planning, programming, and budget process to focus interagency resourcing to achieve National Security goals. Within this process, the NSC needs to play a greater interagency resourcing role. The NSC must improve their ability to evaluate capabilities across agencies and recommend resource tradeoffs. Increased analysis of capabilities and tradeoffs will require incremental realignment of resources and costing by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Because of DoD's size and magnitude (over 52% of the discretionary budget), its PPB processes and lessons learned can be leveraged to improve the national linkages of strategy to resourcing. This paper will provide some required background, briefly outline the DoD process, and explore various DoD studies. From analyses of these studies, it will draw useful lessons that can be applied to create a national PPBS process to improve the linkage between the national strategic planning and resourcing and effectively execute the strategy across the executive branch of government.
I. Background.
There are two branches of government with resourcing responsibilities -Executive which requests the funds and Congress who votes to grant them. Congress has enacted multiple laws that affect agency resourcing and execution. This section provides relevant background to define players and roles within the process and to set the stage for evaluating the effectiveness of their interaction.
Currently the federal budget is divided into non-discretionary and discretionary spending.
Non-discretionary programs are created through entitlement laws such as Social Security and currently compose 53% of federal spending. The discretionary portion of the budget funds the executive agencies and is the most hotly debated within Congress as this is where the real choices lie. Recommendations for funding or redistribution will focus on discretionary funding.
Within the Executive Branch, OMB's role is to establish top line discretionary fiscal guidance. Overall their mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive Branch agencies. They also assist him in improving administrative management, developing better performance measures and reducing any unnecessary burdens on the public. 8 Despite the changing aspects of current threats, today's budget processes are largely unchanged from the Cold War era. Agencies prepare their own budgets in "stovepipes". They decide in relative isolation without coordination
with other agencies what priorities and capabilities to fund. Agency budgets are keyed to OMB's top line fiscal guidance, but not always to common strategic priorities, as they may be articulated at the national level. 9 The constitution grants Congress a fundamental role in allocation of resources and creating laws that affect funding. Iterated in Article I of the constitution, the Legislative Branch has the authority among others to create federal agencies, dictate their purpose, raise taxes, and borrow money. They own the "power of the purse" in regards to funding distribution as well as the ability to make laws that affect executive agencies.
Because the national debt steadily increased in the 80's, they created multiple laws constraining the amount of the discretionary budget. They include the 1985 Balanced Budget
Emergency Deficit Control Act and the reaffirmation of this law in 1987 often referred to as "Graham-Rudman-Hollings acts" named for their principle sponsors. The purpose of this legislation was to insure that deficits and subsequent interest payments were constrained -i.e.
that the U.S. Government didn't spend in its regular appropriations more than what was collected in revenue. One of the fundamental reasons is because in the long run, deficits increase interest payments and decrease discretionary spending. Another relevant term generated by the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act was "pay as you go". Although primarily related to entitlements, the phrase can also be applied to discretionary spending as a whole.
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Although the OMB Oct 06 press release stated that the deficit had "been cut in half," what it really noted was a change in projections of the annual deficit based on inflation factors. It failed to mention that during the period 2001 to 2006, the deficit rose $5.3 trillion to a record amount of $8.6 trillion (156% increase). 11 GAO Comptroller General Walker noted that the current fiscal path threatens the U.S. economy, and ultimately national security. 12 Therefore, the "coming budget crunch associated with security related outlays and the corresponding search for greater efficiencies and savings" have created an environment where "people are more willing to consider far-reaching alternatives for how to organize, plan and implement various national security policies." 13 To protect U.S. economic freedom and national security, any change in strategy and subsequent resourcing will need to be resourced via a realignment of funds rather than an increase in discretionary funding.
Federal law already dictates that agencies prepare strategic plans. The 1993
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) required agencies to submit strategic plans, and create annual performance plans. 14 What agencies have produced in response to this law has consistently been a glossy document that serves a public affairs function, but does little to guide U.S. national security policy making and resource allocation. 15 Therefore, each agency develops strategic plans; however, they are not tied to an integrated strategic plan and do not identify capabilities required to prepare for future challenges.
Generally speaking, the interagency is not a formal structure, which exists in a specific "Goldwater Nichols (GN) legislation passed in 1986 provided increased civilian management of the Department of Defense (DoD) and ensured joint military judgment was an important part of all resource and operational decision-making." 19 One of the purposes of GN was to align the demand for resources (combatant commanders) with supply (services).
Although the process is not yet perfectly implemented, DoD is moving toward total joint integration of capabilities and subsequent programming decisions to resource these capabilities.
This dichotomy between service supply and joint demand will be further developed via the review of various studies.
Currently, resources are organized, managed, programmed and budgeted along service lines. Each subsequent level of detail attempts to further articulate the ways and means of achieving relatively broad national strategy down to actual service budgets and execution. At the end of each major cycle, the DoD integrates across the department and attempts to minimize risk. As a part of risk minimization, alternative ways and means to achieve the objectives are explored by the most senior resource decision body the Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG) composed of OSD principles. 20 Decisions are made, generally to eliminate as much risk in as many categories as possible.
The programming phase is an internal DoD process based on OMB tentative future year top line estimates. At this point in the process, these top line numbers are not congressionally appropriated funds; therefore, it is primarily a "database" exercise. "The purpose of programming is to distribute available manpower, dollars, and material among competing requirements." 21 Although extremely difficult, throughout this process DoD strives to avoid duplication. One of the ways it is attempting to avoid duplication and make tradeoffs is by articulating Joint capabilities required. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviews the service programs and modifies them though documents called Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs). Programming is the sub process that would be most suitable for leveraging to the interagency level because strategic tradeoffs to align strategy to resourcing must be made prior to congressional submission and appropriation.
Following the program process is budgeting and execution. Once the budget is finalized in late January, the Defense Department along with all executive agencies submits them to the OMB who reviews and sends them to the President. The President submits the administration's budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. After Congress appropriates funds, the rules for realignment of resources become much more constrained. Congress completes a similar process to pass authorization legislation which allows programs to exist and describes their functions. Authorization act language can be applicable for a short period (one year) or permanent (become a part of Title X etc) and modify agency responsibilities. 22 Following passing of legislation, agencies expend resources to accomplish approved actions.
Section III Not a Perfect System.
As useful as the PPBE process is for DoD, many critics believe the system needs to be modified to meet the changing situation. While there is much to learn from the DoD resource decision-making process, there have also been many studies that cite potential improvements.
Due to DoD's size and percentage of discretionary resources, it is logical that recommendations to its processes would have relevance to the whole interagency system. 23 Although joint resourcing is much improved since the GN enactment, the study found that the services still dominate the first step in the programming process -the requirements process. Therefore, the full range of solutions available to meet joint warfighting needs is not fully considered especially if existing alternatives reside in a different service or agency. To address this shortfall they recommended creating a DoD Joint capabilities based process for identifying needs, offering alternatives and developing solutions.
The study noted Joint capabilities could be created along functional or operational lines.
"Of the two types of capability categories, functional categories are more enduring -they are less apt to change due to new technology, emerging threats, or doctrine updates." 24 Functional capabilities also provide clearer boundaries to make organizational changes and tradeoffs.
Examples of functional capabilities include: command and control, logistics, battle space awareness and protection. As a result of their recommendations, Combatant Commands (COCOMs) express needs as "capabilities" or desired effects to allow for the widest range of solutions at the beginning of the process.
Senior DoD leadership is focused on fixing problems at the end of the resourcing cycle, rather than early in the planning process. Planning for major joint capabilities must be done at the department level. Senior leaders focus on providing strategic guidance, making decisions in the "front end" of the process, and engaging at key points later in the process. The new process has four major elements: strategy, enhanced planning, resourcing, and execution & accountability.
• Strategy differs in that COCOMs will be more involved in shaping the strategic planning guidance focusing on strategic objectives, priorities and risk tolerance.
• Enhanced planning divides into two main areas -operational and enterprise needs. Operational needs are primarily driven by COCOMs while enterprise (nonwarfighting) needs are identified by OSD and the services.
• Resourcing will be better linked to capabilities and executable. The remainder of the resourcing process is simplified and the program and budget reviews are reduced in scope and level of effort.
• Execution and accountability provides performance assessment and is organized around capability categories spanning both operational and enterprise functions. 25 The desired end state is a streamlined collaborative, yet competitive process that produces more fully integrated joint warfighting capabilities. 26 There is much within this study that can be leveraged to the interagency resourcing process. Improved strategic guidance and planning, also recommended by the QDR, focuses the process on the outcome desiredexpressed as a capability. Functional capabilities would provide a basis for interagency tradeoffs because they are less apt to change due to new technology, and emerging threats. Rumsfield used workarounds to tame the bureaucracy, which unfortunately, helps convince subordinates that having access to senior leaders and controlling information to them is the key to success further discouraging information-sharing and collaboration. Goldwater-Nichols did not address the organization and functions of the National Security Council (NSC). They recommended that further national integration and possible legislation is required to:
• Coordinate policy planning and oversee policy execution with regard to regional crises. This would counter agency parochialism, identify potential disconnects and synergies, and elevate contentious issues to the deputies and principles for decision.
• Review at minimum after each Presidential election the guidance and standard operating procedures for planning complex operations. Primary focus would be on capabilities/division of labor between agencies as well as integration efforts.
• Enhance civilian capacities for conducting complex contingency operations because all agencies (State, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury) are likely to become involved in complex operations abroad.
• Establish a new Agency for stability operations with a civilian stability operation Corps and Reserve.
• Establish a new training center for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would be run jointly by DOD National Defense University and State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center.
• Increase funding for programs that expand opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with their foreign counterparts. Such contacts provide critical insights into partner approaches and capacities regarding complex operations. 37 The QDR echoed some of these same themes of agency capability gaps such as:
• Department of Justice to support the rule of law and building and strengthening civil societies.
• Department of State, comprising less than 6.3% of the discretionary budget, to coordinate reconstruction and stability (Table 1 ).
• Table 2 . Discretionary spending including supplementals. 40 In its study, CSIS emphasized unified effort, which can only be created by unified doctrine and guidance in the form of National Security Planning Guidance. They also recommended expanding the QDR to include a broader perspective and transforming it into the Quadrennial National Security Review. To implement these actions, the NSC role would be recast to be more actively involved in ensuring Presidential intent is realized through USG actions. The outcome of this effort would be a national security strategy that establishes the capabilities required to implement the strategy. 41 Taken together the study team's recommendations regarding interagency processes would create a unified national security approach where none now exist. • Incremental changes. Historically, incremental attempts at reform have a much better chance of success than sweeping changes to existing institutions and capabilities.
• Change Agents. Creating a critical mass along with the role of critical individuals is imperative toward lasting change. This is done through public debate, public interest and analysis of what is feasible, achievable and suitable. 44 The interagency recommendations share a broad theme: get many disparate parts of the U.S. national security structure to row together in both planning and execution. 45 Recommendations for creating a unified national security approach would do much to improve integration and effectiveness of interagency actions. Successful implementation of integrated planning and execution requires a revaluation of the resource allocation process to support it.
Most of the recommendations increase capabilities within non DoD agencies and implicitly require resources. To successfully implement changes to capabilities requires complex tradeoff analyses on how to fund them.
DoD has been refining its PPBE process for 45 years. Despite the common view that DoD's resourcing process reflects an out-dated management approach, senior officials throughout other federal government agencies almost universally perceive it to be superior to any other resource allocation process in the executive branch. 46 Currently, the DoD receives over 52% of the federal discretionary budget. Because of DoD's size, magnitude and reputation, its PPB processes can be leveraged to improve national linkages of strategy and
resourcing. An important element of the DoD process is the fact that strategy and resourcing must be integrated early, well before congressional submission.
All agencies participate in the budget process; however, they are much less likely to have a robust programming effort. The programming process would be well suited to leverage to a national interagency resourcing process since this is the point in time when strategy is aligned to resources and major capability tradeoffs are made. At the national level, the NSC would compose the SLRG. Their role would be to provide direction for alternative ways and means analysis, and provide recommendations to the President for resource allocation. Integration of policy planning and execution, NSC strategic decision-makers need objective analysis that provides good options and results in informed decisions. How to provide them with objective analyses was not addressed and strategy without funding will not be implemented. Due to
Congressional rules for realigning appropriated funds, Congress' "power of the purse" and their ability to modify agency responsibilities, they are an essential player to include in any significant interagency process reform efforts.
Integrating an improved planning function with resourcing would strengthen and reinforce the efficacy of the products required by the Government Performance Results Act such as an agency strategic plan and performance measures. It would also ensure better integration of all of the elements of power in complex operations. The next step in this evolutionary process is creating this integrated national resource process.
Section IV. Recommendations.
The preceding discussion has shown how there is no central coordinating authority to ensure that resources are tied to a unified plan needed for a coherent NSS. To effectively address this challenge, the executive branch must shift its emphasis from department centric approaches toward integrated interagency solutions. Multiple studies recommend the strengthening of the NSC to improve the planning function for it is recognized that success in complex foreign crises requires the nation to simultaneously address all aspects of a crisisdiplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, economic, and social in a coordinated fashion. 47 The executive branch should adopt an improved and simplified DoD programming and budget process to better align interagency resourcing to achieve National Security goals. Much like the DoD Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG), the NSC would guide the process of agency capability costing and analysis. To support the NSC decision-making process, the President would authorize an analytical team to identify the capabilities required and then objectively evaluate them. Creation of a national programming process would also require a costing and process monitor. Therefore, represents about one fifth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States." 50 As noted previously, operational capability rests almost entirely within the DoD since it receives over 52% of the national discretionary budget. As long as this is true, they will be required to perform many roles that other agencies would be better suited to perform (Tables 1 and 2 ). people) in the field. 52 Thus, a mismatch occurs where DoS has the authority for international engagement, but the Department of Defense has many resources to do so. 53 Recommending that an agency, with its current structure and capabilities, assume expanded responsibilities is an empty mandate and will lead to ineffectiveness and failure. To accomplish modification of agency capabilities to implement strategy will require an incremental realignment of resources. Just as CSIS noted money matters in multiple ways and incremental changes have a better chance of success. Therefore, adjustments to funding levels must be incremental in nature to ensure unintended outcomes do not occur. Complex systems such as the federal government have multiple connections and interactions. Aggressive action will often produce exactly the opposite of what is intended -instability and oscillation, instead of moving one more quickly toward one's goal. 54 The NSC should use an incremental approach in modifying agency programs and budgets since this will more likely produce the intended outcome of improved capabilities. The mission of this decision support cell would be to conduct clear well coordinated rational analyses and create alternatives. As mentioned in the article "Reforming Pentagon Decision-making" this cell would also run exercises to train the senior leaders and staff as well as hone intuition about the implications of tradeoffs. Creating and running exercises would educate them about the "language of interrelationships and feedback processes" to improve the process. 55 The NSC must strike a balance; however, between a process that ensures a diversity of views on the most critical issues and a process that creates too many competing power centers and unnecessary friction. 56 Creating a decision support cell would improve the ability to strategically evaluate alternative ways to identify and provide national capabilities to meet the future threat. Improvement would occur over years as the process became more robust and integrated.
Revise and Expand OMB Role. A unified national security strategy must be complemented by integrated resource distribution. This is echoed by the National Defense The overall aim of creating an executive branch integrated planning and programming process is to produce a proactive national resource allocation that is strategy driven, capabilities focused and budget disciplined. In their planning guidance, the NSC would set priorities, clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. 58 OMB would manage a modified resource programming process to incorporate critical NSC resource decisions. Creating an Executive Branch programming process would provide the NSC the time to fully evaluate options and agencies time to plan implementation.
Early resource integration would also better support full consideration of all elements of power and their capabilities. By integrating NSC strategy and resource allocation, it will translate into a better reflection and implementation of the President's NSS and domestic policy goals.
Comparing and evaluating alternatives is impossible without a transparent set of baseline assumptions, operating concepts, methods, metrics, and data. 59 To create an effective programming process, OMB should be empowered to set timelines, standards and enforce a Creating lasting change will take Presidential, Congressional, and key individuals committed to implementing it. Creating a closer relationship between strategy and resource allocation will strategically position the U.S. to achieve its goals and truly create a unified national security approach. Meeting future threats in a complex, uncertain, and volatile world demands it.
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